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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 This dissertation studies two interesting business cycle issues. The first issue concerns the 
effectiveness of tax policies in stimulating an economic recovery. The second issue concerns the 
costs of business cycle fluctuations to an investor who chooses to invest in risky assets. 
 
 The first essay evaluates the effectiveness of the “end of double tax” policy in stimulating 
an economic recovery by analyzing the transitional dynamics of the economy’s aggregates 
toward the steady states. The effectiveness of this policy is compared with two alternative 
policies that reduce corporate income or personal income taxes. Although all of these tax policies 
are found to stimulate the economy’s levels of output and investment, the “end of double 
taxation” appears to exert the most significant impact on the aggregate levels of these variables 
in the short run. Based on this finding, we claim that the “end of double taxation” is an effective 
policy for stimulating an economic recovery in the short-run.  
 
 In a thought-provoking exercise Lucas (1987 and 2003) argues that the welfare costs of 
business cycles is negligible. The second essay follows up on this argument by incorporating 
prospect theory into the formulation of individual preferences. Prospect theory proposes that 
agents care about changes in their wealth level rather than the level of their final wealth, and 
individuals are also taken to be more sensitive to losses than gains in their financial wealth. 
According to the prospect theory, therefore, the agents take fluctuations in the asset returns 
seriously. Results from empirical tests find that an individual investor, on average, would give up 
 viii
2.58-9.49% of the average returns, she receives from investing in the risky asset, in order to 
eliminate all the fluctuations associated with her asset returns. This result is interpreted as an 
indication of much larger welfare costs than Lucas’s estimates.  
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Essay 1: End of Double Taxation and Economic Recovery 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 The long-run impact of capital income taxation on the economy has been extensively 
studied in the literature. In Chamley (1986)’s seminal work, for example, the optimal rate of 
capital income tax is shown to be zero in the steady state of a general equilibrium model without 
uncertainty. Zhu (1992) and Chari et al. (1994) show that a similar conclusion holds for a 
stochastic version of the economy. Lucas (1990), on the other hand, shows that if the capital 
income tax is eliminated and all the government revenues are raised from the labor income tax, 
the long-run growth rate of capital stock and output will increase significantly. Devereux and 
Love (1994) and lugmrohoroI (& (1998) present similar results for economies with human capital 
and with over-lapping generations. 
 Few researchers, however, have paid much attention to the short-run dynamics associated 
with the changes in the capital income tax rate. In particular, when the economy temporarily 
deviates from its long-run growth path and falls into a recession, can the capital income tax rate 
be used as an effective tool to speed up the economic recovery? How does it compare with other 
policy measures such as labor income taxes? This issue has become particularly interesting 
within the context of a recent policy change. In May 2003, the congress passed the “Jobs and 
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act,” in which it promised to eliminate the tax on dividend 
income of the investors retroactive to January 1, 2003 through December 31, 2008. The declared 
goal of the act was to “speed up an economic recovery by encouraging consumer spending and 
promoting private sector investment.” Clearly, the law was very much focused on achieving 
short-term economic objectives.  
 In the U.S. tax system, corporate capital income is taxed at both the corporate and 
individual levels. In the first stage, a company is taxed on its profits, typically at a marginal rate 
of 35%. In the second stage, when the company passes along its profits to the investors in the 
form of dividends, the investors are taxed on the dividends, at a marginal rate of 38.6%. This is 
called “double taxation.” The marginal federal tax rate on capital income sums up to as high as 
60%.  In other words, for every dollar of profit a company could pay out in dividends, as little as 
40 cents actually reaches the investors. If the firms retain the after-tax earnings, the shareholders 
are taxed on the appreciation in the stock value due to the after-tax earnings that are retained and 
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reinvested in the firm. This cumulative tax on retained earnings is up to 48%. If the double 
taxation on capital income is eliminated, a company would pay tax on its profit at the statutory 
corporate tax rate, but there will be no tax on the investors’ dividends. Policy-makers expect that 
the “end of double taxation” on capital income would promote capital formation by encouraging 
the private sector to invest and in turn generate a fast economic expansion. 
 In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of the “end of double taxation” policy as a 
tool for stimulating economic recoveries. Specifically, we study a real business cycle model in 
which firms are subject to the double taxation system similar to the one we just described. In 
period one, a negative and persistent shock “drags” the economy into a temporary recession. 
Then, in an attempt to end the recession, the government eliminates the double taxation on 
capital income. We evaluate the impact of this policy by analyzing the transitional dynamics of 
the aggregate variables towards the steady states. We consider both a “temporary policy” that 
eliminates dividend taxes for only 3 years and a “permanent policy” that eliminates dividend 
taxes forever. We also compare the effectiveness of this policy with two alternative policies that 
reduce labor income and business income taxes. A policy is desirable if it leads to a fast 
transition back to the steady state and causes the least loss of output in a given period of time. 
 Lucas (1990), Devereux and Love (1994) and lugmrohoroI (&  (1998) also study the 
quantitative effect of capital income taxes in general equilibrium models. Using endogenous 
growth models, they are able to identify the impact of this policy on the long-run growth rate of 
the economy. Therefore, their focus is on the “growth effect” of capital income taxes. The model 
environment we consider is a neo-classical economy where the growth rate of the economy is 
deterministic. Eliminating dividend taxes has no growth effect in this environment. Instead, there 
will be a “level effect” which is reflected by changes in steady state output and other aggregate 
variables. The transition dynamics from one steady state level to another is the focus of this 
study, since such dynamics shed light on how the economy recovers from a recession with the 
help of alternative tax policies. 
 The results of our study are summarized as follows. The “end of double tax” policy has 
considerable short-run effect on the economy. For temporary reforms, over the periods of no 
double taxation, the economy exhibits greater increase in the output level than those over the 
periods of reduced corporate income or reduced personal income tax rate. For permanent 
reforms, the “end of double taxation” exerts stronger steady-state output and investment effects 
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compared to those for two other policy reforms. However, the economy’s long run employment 
is stimulated only when the personal income tax rate is reduced permanently.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section 2. Section 
3 presents the parameter values of our benchmark economy and the mechanism that generates 
the transitional dynamics of the economy. Quantitative results are provided in section 4. Section 
5 tests the robustness of our results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Model 
 We consider a decentralized neoclassical economy. The economy consists of three-
sectors: households, firms and the government. The households own the firms and receive profit 
from the firms in the form of dividends. The firms produce a unique good, which can be either 
consumed in the current period or transformed to physical capital in the next period. The 
government taxes the private sector on their earnings from labor as well as capital services to 
finance its spending. 
 
2.1 The Economy 
 There are a large number of infinitely lived identical individuals in the economy. The 
preferences of the representative household are of the following form: 
   )tlln
0t
tc(ln
tmax θ∑∞
=
+β ,      (1) 
where 0<β<1 is the discount factor, θ  represents preference for leisure, and ct and lt are 
consumption and leisure per capita. The utility function is strictly increasing, concave, and twice 
continuously differentiable. 
 The household splits total time between work and leisure activities. Normalizing the total 
time endowment to one, the time constraint takes the following form:   
  1=+ tt ln         (2) 
 The household receives wages at a rate wt for each unit of labor supplied and rent at a rate 
rt for each unit of physical capital (kt) supplied to the firm. In addition, as the owner of the firm, 
he receives dividend from the firm. The household pays taxes on all these incomes at three 
different rates. Thus the budget constraint of the household is 
    ttttttt tkrnwic −+=+ ,      (3) 
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and the tax bill paid by the household at each period of time is as follows: 
   )ikr()]ikr)(1[(nwt tkttbtkttbdttpt φ−τ+φ−τ−ητ+τ= , (4) 
Where pτ >0, dτ >0 and bτ >0 respectively are the rates at which wages, dividends and profits are 
taxed. The index, [ ]1,0∈η , indicates whether or not capital income is taxed twice. The parameter 
kϕ represents the fraction of investment that is deducted from the firm’s taxable income. This 
fraction of deduction from the business taxable income represents an element of the U.S. tax 
code that provides incentive to the private sector to invest.   
 The firm combines physical capital and labor, to produce the final good, using the 
following production technology: 
  α−α= 1tntktAty ,       (5) 
Where α represents the share of capital in total output. At represents the random productivity 
shock variable, which follows AR(1) process, given by:  
  ttt AA ερ +=+1 ,       (6) 
Where 0< ρ <1 is the persistence parameter and ε~ N(0, 2εσ ). 
 The capital accumulation of the economy occurs through the following dynamic 
constraint: 
  tk)1(1tkti δ−−+= ,       (7) 
where δ is the rate of capital depreciation. 
 In equilibrium, profit maximization by the firm implies that both factors are paid their 
marginal products. Thus we have the following: 
  
t
t
t k
yr α= ,        (8) 
  
t
t
t n
yw )1( α−=        (9) 
Given the associated constraints the household chooses consumption, leisure, and capital to 
maximize her lifetime utility, which yields the following necessary conditions for equilibrium:      
   t
tc
λ=1 ,        (10) 
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++ , (12) 
Where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the household’s budget constraint.  
 Equation (10) equates the marginal utility of consumption to its opportunity cost ( tλ ). 
Equation (11) equates the marginal disutility of supplying labor to the after-tax real wage. 
Equation (12) equalizes the post-tax marginal costs and benefits of investing in future capital. 
 The government sets the tax code parameters pτ , dτ , bτ ,η and kϕ to raise a specific level 
of per capita government revenue each period. Government revenue, gt, does not contribute to 
either production or individual utility. For simplicity, we assume that the government budget is 
balanced each period. The budget constraint of the government is defined as follows:  
 )ikr()ikr)(1(nwg tkttbtkttbdttpt φ−τ+φ−τ−ητ+τ= .   (13) 
 A dynamic equilibrium of the economy consists of the sequences { }tg,ty,1tk,tn,tc +  
that satisfies the following: i) given wage and the rates of return on investment, the household 
chooses consumption, leisure and capital accumulation to maximize utility, ii) firms maximize 
profits given the factor prices, iii) government’s budget is balanced and vi) all markets clear. 
 The household’s budget constraint (3) and the government’s budget constraint (13) yield 
the following market clearing condition for the economy: 
   tgtitcty ++= .                              (14) 
 
 3. Calibration and System Dynamics 
 Most parameters are calibrated to be consistent with existing findings in the literature. 
Sometimes we vary some parameters around our initial benchmark settings for robustness check 
purposes. 
 King and Rebelo (2000)[henceforth KR] set the value of labor’s share parameter as 2/3, 
which is a standard value for the long-run labor income share in the U.S. GNP. Following KR we 
set the value of capital’s share in total output, α equal to 0.33. The conventional annual 
depreciation rate used in neoclassical growth literature is 10% (King & Plosser, 1982, KR, 
1990). As we are interested in quarterly analysis, we use δ=0.025. KR derives the value of the 
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discount factor by setting the steady state interest equal to 6.5%, which is the average annual 
return to capital in the U.S.1 For our quarterly model we set β so that the quarterly interest rate is 
(0.065/4)%. In the neoclassical literature, the value of persistent parameter ranges between .9 and 
.979.  We set ρ equal to .95. Following KR (1999) the standard deviation of innovation, σε is set 
0.0072. KR chose the value of leisure preference parameter θ to match the steady state work 
hours, which is 0.20. Following them we set θ to be 3.48. 
 Personal income tax rate, τp, is set to 0.253, on the basis of the 1994 U.S. tax schedule for 
married taxpayers with no children who file IRS form 1040 jointly. Corporate income tax rate, τb, 
is set to 0.35, to match the statutory corporate tax rate. In the U.S. tax system, dividends received 
by a shareholder generally are taxed at the same rate that applies to the personal income tax; the 
capital gains, however, are taxed at a lower rate. The “Job and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation 
Act of 2003”, reduces the 10- and 20-percent long-term capital gain taxes respectively to 5 and 
15%.  In our model, we do not specify the proportion of after-tax profit that is retained by the 
firm and that is distributed as dividends to the shareholders. As the dividend tax is generally 
higher than the tax on capital gains, if all the after-tax profit of the firm of our benchmark 
economy is taxed at the dividend tax rate, elimination of double taxation would generate an 
upward bias in our results. To avoid the bias, the after-tax profit of the firm is taxed at a rate 
equal to the weighted average of tax rates on retained earnings (capital gain) and tax rates on 
dividends. The average dividend pay out for all COMPUSTAT active firms for 1993-2003 was 
17.62% and for 1983-1993 was 28.55%. The average retained earnings in these two periods 
respectively were 82.38% and 71.45%. Therefore, on average, in those 20 years the proportion of 
dividend paid out was 23% and the firms retained 77% of their after-tax profit. Based on these 
estimates, the tax rate on dividend (after-tax profit) for our benchmark model is calculated as 
follows: [average dividend pay out (23%)*tax rate on dividend (25%)+ average retained earning 
(77%)*capital gain tax rate (15%)]=17.3%. 
To capture the double taxation of capital income the index η is set to 1. kϕ  is set to 0.844 
to match the effective marginal capital tax rate, which is 0.16. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The annual average return on the Standard and Poor 500 index over 1948-1986 is 6.5%. 
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Table 1: Parameter Values of Benchmark Model 
Parameter Value        Empirical fact to match 
τp 
τb 
τd 
φk η  
β 
α 
θ 
δ 
γ 
ρ 
εσ  
Personal income tax 
Business income tax 
  Dividend tax 
  Fraction of untaxed investment 
Index 
Discount rate 
Share of capital in GDP 
Preference for leisure 
Rate of capital depreciation 
Long-run growth rate 
Persistence 
Standard deviation of innovation 
0.253 
0.350 
0.173 
0.844 
  1.00 
0.984 
  0.33 
  3.48 
0.025 
1.004 
0.95 
0.0072 
Fitted value from 1994 U.S. tax schedule 
Statutory corporate tax rate 
Average dividend pay out=23% 
Effective marginal capital tax rate=0.16 
Double taxation on business income 
Average returns to capital=6.5%, per annum 
Average share of labor income in GNP = 2/3 
Average post-World War II supply of labor hour=.20 
Share of gross investment= 0.295, per annum          
Average per capita output growth rate=1.6% 
Errors in Solow residual 
Standard deviation of the errors in Solow residual 
 
  The long run growth rate of a neoclassical economy is determined by the 
exogenous rate of technological progress, γ. This long run rate remains unchanged in all the 
alternative tax policy regimes. Thus in the long run, 
   
ty
1ty
tk
1tk
tc
1tc +=+=+=γ ,   
Which is set to 1.004 in our model. 
 To analyze the short-run dynamics of the benchmark economy during different tax policy 
regimes, we linearize the first order conditions around the steady state as in King and Rebello 
(1988). The set of linearized equation yields the following law of motion for the state variables 
of our model:  
11 ++ += ttt mss ε . 
 The following equation specifies, given the initial capital stock and level of productivity, 
how consumption, work effort, investment, government expenditure, output and shadow prices 
are determined by the state variables, in response to a 1% negative productivity shock to the 
economy. 
     tt sz ∏= , 
Where zt is the vector of all the control variables of the model.  
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4. Quantitative Results 
 We calculate the steady state value of output for our benchmark economy where 
individuals are taxed on their personal as well as corporate income and the firms are taxed on 
their profit. In period one, a negative and persistent shock hits the economy and drags output 
below its long run level temporarily. We solve the transitional dynamics of output, of the 
benchmark economy, towards the steady state. In the next step, we assume a policy change in the 
economy that eliminates tax on dividend. The dynamics of output caused by this policy are 
solved and compared to the output dynamics in the benchmark economy. The difference between 
these two dynamics explains the effectiveness of the “end of double taxation” in stimulating the 
economy’s output level. We also evaluate the effectiveness of two other policies in reviving the 
economy from recession in the similar fashion. The first policy reduces the corporate income tax 
and the second policy reduces the tax on individual’s personal income. The impacts of the 
policies on the other variables of the economy, e.g. investment, employment, government 
spending and welfare are also examined. Figures 1 through 10 plot the transition dynamics of the 
variables in alternative tax policy regimes. The quantitative results are presented in three 
subsections. First, the impacts of permanent reforms in the tax policies are examined. Second, we 
solve the dynamics of the economy’s variables generated by temporary reforms in the policies. 
Third, the growth effects of both temporary and permanent policy reforms are briefly discussed. 
 
4.1. Economic Recovery from the Permanent Reforms 
 The permanent tax policy reforms yield new steady state levels for the economy’s 
aggregates. The transitional dynamics from the original steady state levels to the new levels 
describes how the economy recovers from the recession with the help of alternative tax policies. 
The changes in the long run levels of the economy’s aggregates produced by the tax policies are 
reported in Table 2. 
The immediate response to a permanent “end of double taxation” is a 0.78% increase in 
the level of output compared to that in the benchmark economy with double taxation. Figure 1A 
compares the dynamics of output in the “double taxation” economy with that in the “end of 
double taxation” economy.  
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Table 2: Long Run Changes in the Levels  
 
Tax            
Policy 
Changes in Steady State Levels (in percentage) 
Output   Investment  Government   Employment  Welfare 
                                     Spending
η=0 
τb=0.27 
τp=0.238 
0.21   4.85  
0.21           3.10 
0.21           0.31 
-8.89              -2.03          0.023 
-5.26              -1.20          0.014 
-3.92               0.16           0.009 
Note: Row 1, 2 and 3 report the percentage changes in the steady state levels of the economy’s variables 
respectively generated by a permanent “end double taxation”, a permanent 8% reduction in the corporate 
income and a permanent 1.50% reduction in the personal income tax rate, compared to their steady state 
values in the benchmark economy with no reform. The percentage change in the steady state level of output 
generated by a permanent “end of double taxation” is calculated using the following equation: 


 −
y
y1y , 
where y  is the steady state level of output in the benchmark economy with “double taxation” and 1y is the 
steady state level of output yielded by a permanent “end of double tax” policy.   
 
As is clear, the level of output immediately shifts up following the “end of double 
taxation” and continues to move upward until it converges to its higher long run level. We 
calculate that the new steady state output produced by a permanent “end of double tax” policy is 
0.21% higher compared to that in the benchmark economy. 
 
Note: The dotted path describes the output dynamics in the economy with “double taxation”. The ‘×’ path describes 
the output dynamics caused by a permanent “end double taxation”. 
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 In the next step, we examine whether the corporate or the personal income tax policy 
reforms can generate an equivalent increase in the long run output. Starting from the benchmark 
economy in which there is double taxation and the tax rates on personal and corporate incomes 
respectively are 25.3% and 35%, the tax on corporate income is varied. We find that a permanent 
8% reduction in the corporate income tax yields a 0.21% increase in the long run output. From a 
similar exercise, we find that an equivalent increase in the long run output is produced when the 
personal income tax rate is permanently reduced to 23.8%. This rate is 1.2% lower than that in 
the benchmark economy. However, as dividend tax rate is calibrated as the weighted average of 
tax rates on dividend and capital gains and dividends are taxed at the same rate as the personal 
income, when the tax on personal income is reduced permanently, the tax on dividend is 
essentially reduced permanently. This dividend tax rate is 17%, which is 0.3% lower than that in 
the benchmark economy. 
 
Note: The dotted path describes the output dynamics in the benchmark economy. The ‘×’ path describes the output 
dynamics caused by a permanent “end double taxation”; the “•” path describes the dynamics generated by a 
permanent reform in the corporate tax and the‘◊’ path describes the dynamics generated by a permanent reform in 
the personal income tax policy. 
 
 Figure 1B compares dynamics of output produced by the alternative tax policy reforms. 
An important feature of these dynamics is that the initial response of output to the “end of double 
taxation” is much greater than those caused by reductions in the corporate or in the personal 
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income tax rate. In addition, the output trajectory in the “end of double tax” economy lies above 
those in the other economies for about 20 quarters. 
 A permanent “end of double taxation” also stimulates the economy’s long run investment 
level significantly. Figure 2A shows that this policy causes an immediate jump in the economy’s 
investment level; investment increases through time toward its new stationary level.  
 
Note: The dotted path describes the output dynamics in the economy with “double taxation”. The ‘×’ path describes 
the output dynamics caused by a permanent “end double taxation”. 
 
Investment dynamics produced by the alternative policy reforms are compared in Figure 
2B. Although the corporate income tax policy reform initially exhibits an investment advantage 
over the “end of double tax” policy, the investment trajectory driven by the “end of double 
taxation” overtakes that driven by corporate tax policy reform approximately in one year and it 
eventually converges to a higher long run level.  
In the long run, reductions in the corporate income or in the personal income tax that 
yield an equivalent “output effect” generate a relatively weak impact on the economy’s 
investment level. Table 2 reports that the permanent “end of double tax” policy raises the steady 
state investment by 4.85%, while a permanent 8% reduction in the corporate income tax yields a 
3.10% and a permanent 1.5% reduction in the personal income tax yields a 0.30% increase in the 
long run level of investment. 
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Note: The dotted path describes the investment dynamics in the benchmark economy. The ‘×’ path describes the 
investment dynamics caused by a permanent “end double taxation”; the “•” path describes the dynamics generated 
by a permanent reform in the corporate tax and the‘◊’ path describes the dynamics generated by a permanent reform 
in the personal income tax policy. 
 
  
The “end of double tax” policy produces a negative impact on the economy’s long run 
employment level. Figure 3A shows that the employment level drops immediately after 
imposition of this policy; it eventually converges to a new steady state level which is 2.03% 
lower than its benchmark level. It is to be noted that unemployment does not exist in our 
theoretical model. A reduction in the long run employment therefore, does not have any adverse 
impact on the economy. This is revealed in our long run welfare benefit estimation. Table 2 
reports that in the long run the “end of double taxation” generates positive welfare benefit. From 
Equation (1), it follows that in the long run the elimination of dividend tax generates higher 
levels of consumption and leisure for the individuals compared to those in the benchmark 
economy. Thus reduction in the long run employment caused by the “end of double taxation” is 
compensated by an increase in the long run leisure, which in turn increases the long run welfare 
of the individuals. We also find that this welfare benefit is higher than those caused by the 
alternative policy reforms. 
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Note: The dotted path describes the employment dynamics in the economy with “double taxation”. The ‘×’ path 
describes the employment dynamics caused by a permanent “end double taxation”. 
 
 
   
Note: The dotted path describes the employment dynamics in the benchmark economy. The ‘×’ path describes the 
employment dynamics caused by a permanent “end double taxation”; the “•” path describes the dynamics generated 
by a permanent reform in the corporate tax and the‘◊’ path describes the dynamics generated by a permanent reform 
in the personal income tax policy. 
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A comparison of the employment dynamics produced by the alternative tax policy 
reforms are portrayed in Figure 3B. It appears that the economy’s long run employment is 
stimulated only when personal income tax is reduced. One possible explanation of this result 
hinges on the conflicting income and substitution effects of a change in the real wage. It follows 
from Equation (4) that a reduction in the personal income tax raises the real wage in the 
economy. This encourages the individuals to work hard and produces a larger income effect. On 
the other hand, the “end of double tax” policy and a reduction in the corporate income tax induce 
the individuals to enjoy more leisure and produce larger substitution effects. 
 
 
Note: The dotted path describes the government spending dynamics in the benchmark economy. The ‘×’ path 
describes the spending dynamics caused by a permanent “end double taxation”; the “•” path describes the dynamics 
generated by a permanent reform in the corporate tax and the‘◊’ path describes the dynamics generated by a 
permanent reform in the personal income tax policy. 
 
 
  All the tax policies yield a negative impact on the long run government 
spending. The intuition of this is clear from Equations (4) and (13). Adoption of all the tax 
policies immediately drags spending below that in the benchmark economy and the spending 
dynamics caused by the policy reforms remain below that in the benchmark economy through 
time toward the lower stationary levels. However, Table 2 reports that the long run 
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government spending is significantly lower in the “end of double tax” regime compared to 
those in other policy regimes. 
  
4.2. Economic Recovery from the Temporary Reforms 
 In this section, we assume that in the period immediately after the negative shock the 
government eliminates dividend taxes only for 12 quarters. In our set up, temporary reform in a 
tax policy is expected to have transitory impacts on the economy’s aggregates as the aggregates 
eventually converge to their original long run levels. Figures 5 through 8 plot the dynamics of the 
economy’s aggregates generated by temporary reforms in the tax policies. 
 The impacts of a temporary “end of double taxation” throughout the reform period are the 
same as those caused by the permanent “end of double tax” policy during the same span of time. 
For example, as Figure 5 shows, a temporary “end of double taxation” causes an immediate jump 
in output and the output trajectory lies above that in the benchmark economy throughout the 
reform period. We calculate that over these 12 quarters, the economy, on average, enjoys 0.38% 
higher level of output compared to the benchmark economy. But, immediately after the re-
imposition of dividend tax, output drops by -1.81% relative to its benchmark level. After this 
massive decline, the output level increases slowly to catch up with its long run level.  
 
Note: The dotted path describes the output dynamics in the benchmark economy. The ‘×’ path describes the output 
dynamics caused by a temporary “end double taxation”; the “•” path describes the dynamics generated by a 
temporary reform in the corporate tax and the‘◊’ path describes the dynamics generated by a temporary reform in 
the personal income tax policy. 
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 While temporary reforms in the corporate tax and in the personal income tax policies 
stimulate the output level over the reform period, the impacts are much weaker than that 
generated by a temporary elimination of dividend tax. We find that over the reform period, on 
average, temporary reduction in the corporate tax or in the personal income tax, respectively 
yield a 0.056% and a 0.055% increase in the output level relative to that in the benchmark 
economy. While output exhibits a sharp drop immediately after the corporate or the personal 
income tax rates are raised back to their original rates, the magnitude of these drops are 
considerably lower than that caused by the re-imposition of dividend tax. In addition, temporary 
reforms in the corporate or in the personal income tax policies cause a faster transition back to 
the steady state and also cause less loss of output relative to that caused by a temporary “end of 
double tax” policy during the transition towards the steady state.   
 
 
Note: The dotted path describes the investment dynamics in the benchmark economy. The ‘×’ path describes the 
investment dynamics caused by a temporary “end double taxation”; the “•” path describes the dynamics generated 
by a temporary reform in the corporate tax and the‘◊’ path describes the dynamics generated by a temporary reform 
in the personal income tax policy. 
 
 The temporary reforms in the tax policies produce similar impact on the economy’s 
investment level. Over the periods of “end of double taxation” reduced corporate or personal 
income tax rates, on average, the economy experiences respectively 0.25%, 0.28% and 0.01% 
increase in the investment level compared to the benchmark economy. Figure 6 compares the 
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transitional dynamics of investment generated by the temporary reforms in the tax policies. 
Termination of all the policy reforms after 12 quarters cause immediate decline in the economy’s 
investment level. However the magnitude of this downfall is greater for the re-imposition of 
dividend tax compared to those caused by the termination of other policy reforms. In addition, 
the investment trajectory generated by re-imposition of dividend tax lies below those generated 
by termination of the other policy reforms until it reaches the steady state. This implies that 
throughout the transition process, a temporary “end of double tax” policy causes greater loss of 
investment relative to that caused by the temporary reforms in the other tax policies. 
 
 
Note: The dotted path describes the employment dynamics in the benchmark economy. The ‘×’ path describes the 
employment dynamics caused by a temporary “end double taxation”; the “•” path describes the dynamics generated 
by a temporary reform in the corporate tax and the‘◊’ path describes the dynamics generated by a temporary reform 
in the personal income tax policy. 
 
 Figure 7 shows that even during the reform periods a temporary “end of double taxation” 
or a temporary reduction in the corporate tax do not stimulate the economy’s employment level, 
which is consistent with the results for permanent policy reforms.  
 As in each period, the government budget is balanced, immediately after the tax policy 
reforms are terminated, the economy’s government spending increases and converges to its long 
run level quickly. 
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Note: The dotted path describes the spending dynamics in the benchmark economy. The ‘×’ path describes the 
spending dynamics caused by a temporary “end double taxation”; the “•” path describes the dynamics generated by 
a temporary reform in the corporate tax and the‘◊’ path describes the dynamics generated by a temporary reform in 
the personal income tax policy. 
 
 
4.3. The “Growth Effects” 
 As the long run growth rate of our benchmark economy is determined exogenously, the 
tax policy reforms are expected to have only transitory effects on the economy’s growth rate. In 
this section, we analyze the effects of both “permanent” and “temporary” reforms in the tax 
policies on the short-run growth. The results are summarized in Figure 9 and 10. 
 Figure 9 shows that a permanent “end double taxation” generates a transitory increase in 
the output growth rate compared to its long-run rate. As expected, the length of the transitional 
dynamics is short and the economy reaches its steady state growth rate quickly. An important 
feature of the dynamics is that the increase in growth rate generated by a permanent “end of 
double tax” policy is higher than those caused by permanent reductions in the corporate or in the 
personal income tax rate. We calculate that in the period immediately after the dividend tax is 
eliminated, output grows at a rate 2.14% higher than that in the benchmark economy. The growth 
rates yielded by the reforms in corporate or personal income tax policy in this period respectively 
are 0.49% and 0.38% higher than that in the benchmark economy.  
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Note: The dotted path describes the growth dynamics in the benchmark economy. The ‘×’ path describes the growth 
dynamics caused by the temporary “end double taxation”; the “•” path describes the dynamics generated by reform 
in the corporate tax and the‘◊’ path describes the dynamics generated by reform in the personal income tax policy. 
 
 Figure 10 shows that, similar to that for the permanent reforms, a temporary “end of 
double tax” policy produces stronger short-run growth effects than those produced by the two 
other policy reforms. Immediately after the reforms are terminated, output exhibits a negative 
growth effect for a short period. However, as before, the length of the transition dynamics is 
short and the economy’s growth rate catches up with its long run rate quickly. 
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 The above results provide a few important messages regarding the impacts of the 
alternative tax policies on the economy. For a quick economic recovery a temporary as well as a 
permanent reform in the policies appear to be useful. While the permanent reforms generate long 
run output advantages, the temporary reforms generate only temporary advantages. Therefore, 
the permanent reforms in the policies are preferable compared to the temporary reforms. While a 
permanent reduction in the corporate or in the personal income tax rate may yield the same 
“output effect” as that yielded by a permanent “end of double taxation”, initially the “end of 
double tax” policy exerts much stronger impact on output that lasts for a considerably long 
period (about 20 quarters).  The permanent “end of double tax” policy also causes a faster 
transition back to the steady state output. The “investment effect” as well as the “welfare effect” 
of a permanent “end of double tax” policy appear to be stronger than those produced by the two 
other policy reforms. Thus as a tool for achieving quick economic recovery a permanent “end of 
double taxation” turns out to be more desirable than the two other policy reforms. On the other 
hand, when the reforms are adopted only for a short period, the transition period of output to its 
steady state is the longest for “end of double taxation”. In addition, the re-imposition of dividend 
tax causes greater output as well as investment losses compared to those caused by the 
termination of two other policy reforms.  
 
5. Sensitivity Analysis 
  We perform some computational experiments with different choices for some parameter 
values to determine the robustness of the main quantitative results derived in the previous 
section. Table 3 reports the results of these experiments. 
 First two rows of Panel A in Table 3 reports the steady state impacts of a permanent “end 
of double tax” policy in an economy that departs from the benchmark economy only with respect 
to the firm’s decision regarding dividend pay out. In the pervious section, we used a tax rate of 
17.3% on dividend based on the historic average of 77% earning retention rate of the firms. In 
this section, we re-calculate the impacts of the tax policies by changing the proportion of after-
tax profit retained by the firms. First, we assume that the firms do not retain any earnings after 
paying tax on its profit. Hence, given that the “double taxation” prevails in the economy, the 
shareholders pay tax on their dividends at the rate that applies to personal income. 
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Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis 
Note: In our benchmark economy, the share of capital in output, α=0.33, the fraction of deductible business taxable 
income, ϕk = 0.844, the capital depreciation rate, δ= 0.025, the double taxation index, η=1, the corporate income tax 
rate, τb=0.35 and the personal income tax rate, τp=0.253. 
 
The tax function takes the following form: 
 )ikr()]ikr)(1(nw[t tkttbtkttbttpt φ−τ+φ−τ−η+τ=    (15) 
 We find that when the firms distribute the entire after-tax profit as dividends, a permanent 
“end of double tax” policy exerts much stronger long run impacts on output as well as on 
Aggregate Changes in the Levels (in percentage) 
 
 
Tax Policy 
Output Investment Government    
Spending 
Employment    Welfare 
Panel A:  “End of Double Taxation”, 0=η  
Retained earning=0 0.58 8.13 -12.43 -2.93 3.44 
Retained earning=. 9,τd = .16 0.16 4.38 -8.20 -1.86 2.08 
α = .30 0.15 4.79 -8.04 -1.77 1.87 
α = .35 0.24 4.89 -9.32 -2.17 2.58 
ϕk = .5 3.93 17.70 -7.67 -2.01 3.88 
ϕk = .99 -1.85 -1.54 -8.33 -2.01 1.26 
δ = .015 -0.36 4.26 -9.95 -2.55 2.76 
δ = .035 0.57 5.22 -8.06 -1.65 1.96 
Panel B:  Reduction in Corporate Income Tax, 270.0b =τ  
Retained earning=0 0.42 3.55 -4.56 -1.09 1.37 
Retained earning=. 9,τd =.16 0.17 3.03 -5.32 -1.21 1.38 
α = .30 0.16 3.05 -4.76 -1.05 1.14 
α = .35 0.24 3.13 -5.51 -1.29 1.58 
ϕk = .5 2.47 10.34 -4.36 -1.19 2.38 
ϕk = .99 -1.09 -0.89 -4.94 -1.19 0.75 
δ = .015 -0.13 2.75 -5.87 -1.52 1.68 
δ = .035 0.42 3.31 -4.78 -0.98 1.20 
Panel C:  Reduction in Personal Income Tax, 238.0p =τ  
Retained earning=0 0.27 0.82 -4.37 0 1.12 
Retained earning=. 9,τd =.16 0.20 0.24 -3.87 0.18 0.91 
α = .30 0.18 0.27 -4.12 0.14 0.88 
α = .35 0.22 0.31 -3.81 0.17 0.98 
ϕk = .5 0.27 0.51 -3.40 0.16 0.92 
ϕk = .99 0.16 0.17 -4.30 0.16 0.94 
δ = .015 0.25 0.34 -3.69 0.20 1.00 
δ = .035 0.18 0.27 -4.10 0.13 0.89 
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investment than those in our original exercise. These long run impacts are also significantly 
greater than those produced by the other policy reforms. On the other hand, when the earning 
retention rate is high (90%), the impact of “end of double tax” policy on the long run output is a 
little weaker than those caused by the other policy reforms. The intuition of these results can be 
understood by comparing Equation (4) with Equation (15). It follows from Equation (4) that 
when the firms retain a proportion of after-tax earning, the shareholders pay tax on the dividends 
at a rate of τd, which is calibrated as 17.3%. On the other hand, Equation (15) shows that when 
the firms distribute the entire after-tax profits as dividends and “double taxation” prevails, 
dividends are taxed at a higher rate (25.3%). Therefore when the dividend pay out ratio is high 
and the tax on dividend is eliminated, the shareholders receive higher returns on their investment 
compared to that when the dividend pay out is less. This encourages the shareholders to invest 
more. 
  We test the sensitivity of our results to capital’s share in total output by considering an 
increase in capital’s share (set α= .35) and also a decrease in capital’s share (set α= .30) in 
output relative to that in the benchmark economy. For a higher value of α, the impact of “end of 
double taxation” is stronger than that for its benchmark value; for a lower value, its impact 
appears to be considerable. In addition, for both values of α, the impact of this policy on the long 
run investment is significant. These results prove the robustness of our previous findings. 
 We examine the sensitivity of our results to changes in the fraction of deductible business 
taxable income from its benchmark value ( kϕ =0.844). For a lower value of kϕ ( kϕ =0.5), all the 
tax policies exert significant impacts on the steady state output and investment, the impacts of 
“end of double tax” policy however appears to be the strongest. An interesting finding is, for a 
near complete deduction of business taxable income ( kϕ =0.99), the impacts of “end of double 
taxation” on the long run output as well as investment are negative. The intuition of this result 
follows from equation (4). When kϕ =0.99, the shareholder’s total amount of taxable corporate 
income is significantly reduced. Therefore eliminating dividend tax does not increase the returns 
on investment significantly. On the other hand, when amount of taxable corporate income is 
large, the “end of double taxation” encourages the household to invest more as it implies that she 
receives higher returns on a larger amount of corporate income. 
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6. Conclusion 
 The paper evaluates the effectiveness of “end of double tax” policy in stimulating a quick 
economic recovery. We compare the impacts of this policy with those of two other policy 
reforms that reduce personal income and business income taxes. We consider both “permanent” 
and “temporary’ reforms in these policies. A simple neoclassical model with exogenous growth 
is used as a benchmark economy. 
 We find that the tax policy reforms have considerable influence on the economy and that 
the transitional effects of different policy reforms on the economy’s variables play a useful role 
in evaluating the overall impact of the policies. Given that the temporary reforms only offer 
temporary benefits, the permanent reforms in the taxation policies are more useful for the long 
run economic well-being. While all the tax policy reforms considered in this study stimulate the 
long-run levels of output as well as investment of the economy, we find a significant quantitative 
difference. A permanent “end of double taxation” yields higher level of output compared to those 
yielded by permanent reforms in the other policies for a considerably long period; this policy 
also causes a faster transition back to the steady state output. The reforms in the corporate 
income or the personal income tax policies that yield an equivalent steady state “output effect” 
generate a relatively weak impact on the economy’s long run investment level.  A sensitivity 
analysis performed in section 6 proves the robustness of our analysis and also gives us some 
additional insights regarding the effectiveness of the “end of double tax”. We find that 
eliminating dividend tax can actually reduce the steady state output if the firm’s investment 
expenditure is almost entirely deducted from their taxable income. On the other hand, when the 
firms are taxed on a significant proportion of their investment spending, eliminating dividend tax 
exerts significant output benefit. We also find that the higher is the dividend pay out, the greater 
is the impact of “end of double tax” policy on the long run output of the economy. Based on our 
findings we claim that a permanent “end of double taxation” is an effective fiscal tool for 
stimulating an economic recovery.  
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Essay 2: Prospect Theory and the Welfare Cost of Business Cycles 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 According to Lucas (1987), the welfare cost of business cycles is small and negligible. 
Using a simple representative agent model where preferences of the agents are logarithmic, he 
estimates the welfare cost as the percentage of consumption the consumers would be willing to 
pay to switch from a fluctuating consumption path to a perfectly smooth consumption path. He 
finds that to have all the volatilities in consumption eliminated, the consumer would only give up 
less than one-tenth of one percent of consumption (about $8.5 per person per quarter).  
 Lucas’s provocative claim naturally stirs up a series of new attempts to re-examine the 
issue. Many of these efforts involve the relaxation of Lucas’ assumptions on consumer 
preferences and the consumption processes. In a later survey paper, however, Lucas (2003) 
points out that these extensions mostly give rise to similar conclusions. For example, Otrok 
(2001) incorporates time-non-separabilities in consumer preferences in his welfare cost 
calculation, and finds that the welfare cost is of the same magnitude as that estimated by Lucas. 
Dolmas (1998) estimates the potential welfare gains from eliminating consumption volatility 
using non-expected utility and finds that depending on parameter choices, the gains range from 
one to twenty percent of consumption. However, he concludes that for reasonable parameter 
choices the welfare cost of consumption volatility is always significantly below the welfare 
benefit of an additional percentage point of consumption growth in perpetuity. Campbell and 
Cochrane (1999) calculate the welfare cost by incorporating habit formation into the formulation 
of consumer preferences. They find that the cost of consumption volatility is significantly large. 
However, Lucas points out that the result largely hinges on the relaxation of the size of an extra 
parameter that does not exist in standard utility functions. 
 In this paper we also calculate the welfare cost of business cycle fluctuations. Our angle 
is to incorporate a new behavioral theory about consumers – the “prospect theory” – into the 
formulation of consumer preferences. The prospect theory was first proposed by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979). They conducted psychological tests to investigate how the agents behave and 
make decisions when they face different kinds of gambles. Their experiment revealed two 
important aspects of investors’ psychology. First, the investment decisions of the agents are 
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affected by the gains and losses in their wealth and not by the final state of their wealth. Second, 
when the agents experience an equal amount of gain and loss in their wealth, they are hurt 
significantly more by the loss than get pleasure from the gain. This attitude of the agents is 
termed as “loss aversion.” We believe these behavioral rules may turn out to be crucial in terms 
of measuring the cost of business cycles. For one thing, we concern about business cycles mainly 
because of the possible losses – either losses of consumption during a recession, or losses of 
wealth during inflation. For another, most would not deny that these losses concern us more than 
the gains during “good times.” 
 The prospect theory has been quite popular in economics and behavioral finance. In 
particular, it has been used to offer a solution for the “equity premium puzzle” in financial 
market studies. The equity premium puzzle refers to the abnormally high difference in the 
returns between a risky asset such as equity and a risk-free asset that cannot be explained by 
theories. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) argue that if an investor is loss averse and has the tendency 
to monitor changes in the value of his portfolio frequently, a high equity premium is required to 
compensate him for the volatilities in stock returns. Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) offer an 
explanation of the equity premium puzzle using the prospect theory preferences in a general 
equilibrium framework. They show that if the loss aversion attitude of an investor is combined 
with the tendency to become more risk-seeking after gains have occurred and more risk-averse 
after a sequence of losses, highly volatile stock returns and high equity premium might be 
generated in equilibrium.  
 The ability of the prospect theory to explain the investor’s behavior and psychology 
under uncertainty inspires us to incorporate this theory in our study. We proceed as follows. To 
be consistent with the prospect theory, we assume that the agent derives direct utility from the 
returns on his financial investments as well as from consumption. The returns fluctuate during 
the course of business cycles, resulting in gains from investment in some periods and losses in 
the others. The agent prefers to have smooth returns and is willing to pay a fraction of the returns 
she receives to eliminate all the volatilities in the returns on her investments. In this way she can 
enjoy the utility from the smooth returns and does not have to worry about any loss in her asset. 
We follow Lucas’ method to calculate the percentage of the returns the agent would pay to have 
all the fluctuations in the returns on her investments eliminated. We find that for reasonable 
values of our parameters, the agent would give up 2.58-9.49% of the average returns on her 
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investments to switch from the world with return fluctuations to the world of zero fluctuations. 
We believe that this indicates a welfare cost that is much larger than Lucas’s estimates. 
 Our study therefore relies heavily on the premises of the prospect theory that losses in 
financial returns are critical to consumers, and such losses occur during the course of business 
cycles and can be used to measure the cost of these cycles. A natural question, then, is how 
closely fluctuations in investment returns are related to business cycle fluctuations. Researchers 
have documented substantial linkages between an economy’s performance and the performance 
of financial markets, including the procyclical movements of stock prices. In fact, the positive 
correlation of stock price index and real economic activity over the course of many business 
cycles is one of the major empirical facts about the US economy. If the macroeconomic growth 
rises, demand for a typical company’s product rises and the revenue of the company should also 
increase. This leads to an appreciation of the company’s share price. Likewise, during a 
marcoeconomic downfall the demand for a company’s product declines and this eventually 
results in a share price decline.  
 
 Figure 11: Real GDP and S & P 500 Composite Index   
  
 Note: The ‘- -’ line represents detrended real GDP and the ‘__ __’ line represents detrended 
 S & P 500 stock index returns. 
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In Figure 11, we plot HP-filtered real GDP of the U.S. and the S&P 500 stock index. It is 
quite evident that, while the stock price index is much more volatile than GDP, it is strongly pro-
cyclical. We calculate the contemporaneous correlation between the real GDP and stock price as 
0.37. Our findings resemble the time series analysis of the major macro variables documented by 
King and Rebelo (2000). 
Financial returns and business cycles are related in another important aspect. The stock 
market is forward-looking and responds to where the economy is going in the near future. If the 
economy is currently in a recession, the stock market will predict a recovery before it actually 
takes place and the stock price will rise before the recession ends. Pearce (1983) evidences that, 
with a very few exceptions, stock price movements have been a valuable leading indicator of the 
business cycles in the US economy. The traditional view as to why movements in stock prices 
generally precede the movements in real economic activity suggests that stock prices equal the 
present value of a company's expected future profits. If the investors lower their expectation of 
profits because of a prospective economic downturn, stock prices would fall immediately, i.e. 
before the actual fall in the company’s profit and economic activity. Another view of why stock 
prices may lead economic activity emphasizes investors' level of confidence about the economy. 
If investors are optimistic about the prospect of the economy, they would be willing to make 
investments and the stock prices would begin to rise. On the other hand, pessimism about the 
economy will drag stock prices down. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a brief review of prospect 
theory preferences. Section 3 discusses the framework of our analysis and also outlines the 
methodology used to estimate the welfare cost. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 tests the 
robustness of the results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Prospect Theory and Consumer Preferences 
 In a prospect theory framework, the utility of an agent is defined over gains and losses in 
her wealth, rather than over her final wealth level. Gains and losses in wealth are compared to 
some neutral benchmark level of wealth. The agent is assumed to be loss averse, implying that 
losses hurt her more significantly than gains yield pleasure. The pain of losing $1 to a loss-averse 
agent is, therefore, higher than the pleasure of gaining $1. The fact that the agent treats gains and 
losses differently is reflected in the utility function that has a kink at the origin. The slope of the 
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loss function is steeper than the slope of the gain function, implying that the agent weighs the 
disutility from a loss more strongly than the utility from the same magnitude of a gain. The ratio 
of the slopes at the origin is a measure of loss aversion. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose 
the following prospect utility function: 
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Where X is a change measured as the difference in wealth relative to the benchmark level of 
wealth. While Kahneman and Tversky use previous period’s wealth level as the benchmark, both 
the purchase price the investor pays for her wealth and the returns on wealth in the previous 
period are also reasonable benchmark levels of wealth. When 0≥X , the agent’s wealth level is 
higher than the benchmark, a gain is realized. According to equation (1), this yields utility from 
the gain in her wealth level. Otherwise, when X<0, the agent’s wealth level is lower than that at 
the benchmark level – a loss has occurred. As the agent is more sensitive to a loss realization, her 
level of disutility from a loss is higher than the utility from a gain by the degree of loss aversion 
λ, which is set to be larger than 1. The parameters α and β are estimated to be 0.88.   
 
        Figure 12: Utility Function Supported by the Prospect Theory 
 
Note: AB represents an increase in utility caused by a gain (2) and AC is a decrease in utility caused by a 
loss of equal amount (-2). The kink at the origin measures the degree of loss aversion. 
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Figure 12 displays the form of the prospect theory preferences. When the agent realizes 
the same amount of gain and loss is her wealth level, the disutility caused by the loss, AC is 
larger than the utility caused by the same amount of gain, AB. 
 
3. The Framework 
 The framework of this paper is a simplified version of Barberis, Huang, and Santos 
(2001)’s consumption-based asset pricing model2. The agents of the economy invest in assets 
each period. There are two types of assets in the economy: a risky asset and a risk-free asset. 
Consumer preferences bear the same feature as the one presented in the previous section. 
 
3.1. Consumer Preferences 
 The representative agent derives utility from the returns on her investments as well as 
from consumption. The preferences of the representative agent are of the following form:   
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Where the parameter 0<ρ<1 is the time discount factor and δ >0 controls the curvature of utility 
over consumption. The first term of the utility function represents the utility over consumption at 
period t. The second term of the utility function represents the agent’s utility from the returns on 
her investments. The variable Xt represents the returns the investor realizes at period t from her 
investments at period (t-1). The utility she receives from Xt is given by the function v. This 
implies that the agent cares about the returns on her investments and derives direct utility from 
the returns. The parameter, bt is the exogenously determined scaling factor that captures the 
overall importance of utility from fluctuations in the returns relative to the utility from 
consumption. bt is specified as follows: 
γ−= tt Cbb 0 , where tC is the aggregate consumption at 
period t. We assume that b0>0, as b0 = 0 reduces our framework to the consumption-based model 
with power utility. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Barberis, Huang, and Santos assume that the degree of loss aversion depends on the prior investment performance. 
For simplicity we assume that it remains constant overtime. 
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3.2. Measuring gains and losses 
 We consider the returns on the risk-free asset offered by the economy as the benchmark 
to which the agent compares gains and losses from her investments in the risky asset. In the 
beginning of each period the agent decides to invest in the risky asset. At the end of each period 
the agent compares the returns she receives from the risky assets to the risk-free rate offered by 
the economy in that period. The difference between the risky and the risk-free returns is referred 
to as the “excess return.” If in any period the excess returns turn out to be positive the agent has 
realized a gain on her investments in that period, while the negative excess returns imply that a 
loss has occurred. Specifically, if tR is the return on the risky asset received by the agent at the 
end of period t-1, i.e. at period t and 
tf
R is the risk-free rate offered by the economy at period t, 
then, at the end of period t-1, the agent realizes a gain if: 
tftt
RRX −= >0 and a loss: if 
tftt
RRX −= <0. 
 The logic behind such a definition of gain or loss is that, the investor is likely to be 
disappointed with her decision to invest in the risky asset when the returns she receives from the 
risky asset is less than the risk-free rate offered by the economy. For example, if in any period 
the risk-free rate is 4% while the agent receives 3% from investing in the risky asset, she might 
regret her past decision to invest in the risky asset as she could have avoided the risk associated 
with the risky investments and realize higher returns by deciding to invest in the risk-free asset. 
On the other hand, when the returns on risky investments is higher than that from the risk-free 
asset the investor is likely to be happy about her decision of investing in the risky asset and 
consider the positive excess returns as a gain from her investments. This is a key feature of the 
prospect theory. 
 
3.3. Utility from Gains and Losses 
 To define the investor’s utility from returns, we consider two separate cases. First, we 
consider a linear prospective function where the utility from returns depends only on the 
investor’s degree of loss aversion. This is captured by the following prospective utility function:  
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 This is a linear prospective utility function similar to that displayed in Figure 12.  λ=1 
corresponds to loss neutrality and loss aversion grows as λ increases. Thus the function allows us 
to investigate whether the agent’s perception about the fluctuations in the returns changes when 
her degree of loss aversion changes.  
 Our second prospective preference is the same as that proposed by Kahneman and 
Tversky, Equation (1). The function is similar to that shown in Figure 12, however, is slightly 
concave over gains and convex over losses. 
         
3.4. Welfare Cost Estimation 
 We calculate the welfare cost of business cycles using Lucas’s method. Lucas’s method 
of welfare cost estimation is simple. He specifies a preference function for the representative 
consumer and a consumption process that resembles the actual aggregate consumption time 
series of the US economy. The expected utility the consumer receives from the fluctuating 
consumption stream is compared to the utility the consumer receives from the smooth 
consumption stream with the same average consumption growth rate. The welfare cost is the 
percent of consumption the consumer would pay, at every date and state, to switch from the 
fluctuating economy to the non-fluctuating economy. Specifically, Lucas calculates the percent 
of consumption, g, which satisfies the following:  
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The left-hand side represents expected utility the agent derives from the fluctuating consumption 
stream, 0tc  and the right hand side is her expected utility from the smooth consumption 
process stc . “g” is the percent of consumption the consumer would pay to move from the 
fluctuating consumption stream to the smooth consumption stream. According to Lucas’s 
definition, “g” represents the welfare cost of business cycles to the consumer. Using a constant 
relative risk aversion (CRRA) preference function and a consumption stream that includes a 
trend and also a cycle component, Lucas calculates “g” as follows: 
2
z
2
z .2
1)(g σσ≅σ         (5) 
Where σ is the constant coefficient of relative risk aversion and zσ is the standard deviation of 
the log of consumption about trend.        
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 The complexity of our utility function in (2) makes this calculation less straightforward. 
However, a useful simplification makes this function more tractable. Note that the first part of 
our utility function is essentially identical to Lucas’s. Since he already concludes that the welfare 
cost of this part is negligible, we can ignore gains and losses resulted from it by setting c to be a 
constant for all t. Moreover, this also allows us to isolate the effect of loss aversion on the 
welfare cost of business cycles. Thus, we focus on the cost of fluctuations in the asset returns.  
 We need to define our new variables for the left-hand-side and the right-hand-side for (4). 
“Smooth returns” refer to the average excess returns the agent receives from her long-term 
investments in the risky asset. We put this on the right-hand-side. “Fluctuating returns” refers to 
the excess returns the agent receives each period from her investments in the risky asset. We put 
in on the left-hand-side. The "prospective utility" the agent receives from the fluctuating returns 
is computed by taking the expected value of utilities from gains and losses realized by the agent 
each year. Expected prospective utility the agent receives from the fluctuating returns is 
compared to her utility over the smooth returns. The welfare cost of the fluctuating returns is the 
percent of the average excess returns the investor would give up at every period, to move from 
the world of the fluctuating returns to the world of smooth returns.  
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Where n is the number of periods considered in this study. “g” is the percent of the excess 
returns required to leave the agent indifferent between the world of fluctuating returns and the 
world of smooth returns. 
We assume that the agent’s expectations about the excess returns remain unchanged over 
the years, e.g. EEt = . Let XXE tt =)( . As X  is positive, Equation (6) can be written as 
follows: 
)X(EU)gX( t
n
0t
t =−ρ∑
=
       (7) 
From Equation (7), the welfare cost of volatility is calculated as follows: 
  )]X(EU)
1
1[(Xg tnρ−
ρ−−=       (8) 
And for Kahneman and Tversky preference, Equation (6) can be written as follows: 
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From Equation (9), the welfare cost of volatility is calculated as follows: 
α
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We estimate “g”, by substituting U(Xt) in the right-hand side of Equation (8) and (10) by 
the appropriate prospective utility function for gains and losses realized by the investor each 
year. 
 Our assumptions about a constant long-term expected return and fluctuating annual 
returns map closely into the stylized facts of the financial market. In the time series, the annual 
returns on a typical risky asset such as stock has a high mean and excessive volatility, whereas 
the annual returns on a risk-free asset such as Treasury bills has a lower mean and very modest 
volatility. In the cross section there is a substantial premium, i.e., the average difference between 
the returns on a typical stock and Treasury bills is historically positive and very large.3 
Therefore, in any specific year, the returns on investments in the risky assets are uncertain, but it 
is certain that the investor will realize a substantial gain from her long-term investments in the 
risky asset. The positive average excess returns the investor receives from her long-term 
investments deliver positive utility. On the other hand, as the annual returns on the risky asset are 
volatile, the annual excess returns over the risk-free returns are also volatile. In some periods the 
excess return is positive, causing gains and delivering utility to the agent, while it is negative in 
other periods, causing losses and delivering disutility to the agent. 
 
4. Computation and Quantitative Results 
 We need to calibrate two key parameters for calculating the welfare cost. The value of λ 
determines how keenly an agent feels a loss relative to a gain. The higher the value of λ, the 
higher the degree of loss aversion of the investor, and her utility level will decline more rapidly 
when a loss occurs. Tversky and Kahneman (1992)’s estimate suggest that the disutility of a loss 
is twice as much as the utility of a gain of the same magnitude. They estimate λ=2.25. We use 
                                                 
3 Mehra (2003) reports that over the last century the average annual returns on the U.S. stock market has been 7.8% 
and the standard deviation is about 20%, whereas the real returns on a relatively riskless security has been 1% with a 
standard deviation of about 4%. The large difference between the returns on the risky and risk-free assets, among 
many others, is also reported in Siegel(2002), Friedman & Laibson (1989).  
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different values in the neighborhood of 2. In the standard literature the value of the parameter 
determining the curvature of the utility function usually ranges between 0 and 3. We assign 
different values of α that ranges between 0.05 and 3. 
 We calculate the value of g by using the financial market data. The annual returns on the 
S & P 500 index are obtained for the years 1962-2002 from the CRSP database to represent the 
returns on the risky asset. The returns on Treasury bills are obtained from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis’s database for the same sample period. For our sample period, the average 
annual return on the S & P 500 is high (11.89%) and it is volatile with a standard deviation of 
16.63%. The average annual return on Treasury bills is 5.97% with a standard deviation of 
2.52%.  
 In the first step of the welfare cost estimation, we calculate the annual outcome of the 
agent’s investments in the risky asset by comparing the annual returns on the S & P 500 to those 
from the Treasury bills. It is to be noted that we do not distinguish between the total value of the 
investor’s holding of financial assets and the total value of financial asset she invests in the risky 
asset. Although there are two types of assets in the economy, we assume that the agent invests 
only in the risky asset and uses the returns on risk-free asset as a benchmark to evaluate the gains 
and losses on her investments. When the risk-free returns of the economy is considered as a 
benchmark, it is irrelevant whether gains and losses from investments are calculated over the 
total financial wealth of the agent or only over her total investments in the risky asset. The reason 
is as follows: if B and S represent the agent’s holdings of the risk-free asset and the risky asset, 
and she considers the risk-free rate as the benchmark, then at time t, the returns on investment = 
(B
tf
R +S tR )-(B+S) tfR  is the same as S( )tft RR − . Assuming that each year the agent invests $1 
in the risky asset, the returns on her investments, S( )
tft
RR − =
tft
RR − , is the excess returns 
from the risky investments over the risk-free rate, which represents the gains and losses from 
investments by our agent. We find that, out of 41 years of our sample period, the excess returns 
from the risky investments are negative for fifteen years and positive for all the other years. The 
average excess return on the S & P 500 over Treasury bills return is 5.91%. Thus, in the world of 
fluctuating returns our agent realizes gains in 26 years and losses in 15 years from investing in 
the risky asset. In the smooth world she realizes substantial gains from her investments. In the 
second step, we calculate the prospective utility the investor receives, in the fluctuating world, 
from investing in the risky asset. Finally, we compare the prospective utility the agent derives 
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from the fluctuating returns to the expected utility she derives from the smooth returns to 
calculate the cost of fluctuating returns.  
 We calculate the costs of fluctuating returns for different values of loss aversion 
parameter using Equations (8) and (10). We also calculate the costs by substituting the 
consumption volatility, zσ , in Equation (5) with the returns volatility, i.e., we set zσ to 0.1670, 
which is the standard deviation of excess returns. The costs calculated from Equations (8) & (10) 
and Equation (5) allow us to compare the costs of volatility produced by prospective preference 
with those produced by Lucas’s preference. Table 4 summarizes the results. The entries in the 
table are the percentage of the excess returns the investor is willing to give up to switch to a 
world of smooth returns from a world of volatile returns. 
 
Table 4: Welfare Cost of Fluctuations in Asset Returns 
 
                    Lucas     
(return) 
λ =1 λ =1.5 λ =1.8 λ =2 λ =2.25 λ =2.5 λ =3 
α= 1 1.39 0.28 2.58 3.97 4.89 6.04 7.19 9.49 
α=. 05 .069 5.92 5.92 5.92 5.92 5.92 5.92 5.92 
α=. 1 0.14 5.91 5.92 5.92 5.92 5.92 5.92 5.92 
α=. 2 0.28 5.85 5.91 5.92 5.92 5.92 5.92 5.94 
α=. 5 0.70 3.98 5.25 5.69 5.86 5.91 5.81 5.10 
          Note: The values of α represents the degree of risk aversion for Lucas preference. α=1 reduces the 
Kahneman and Tversky utility function to a linear prospective utility function. 
 
 
 The welfare cost of fluctuating returns for prospective preference ranges from 2.58-
9.49% of the average excess returns. In dollar terms, if in any year the investor receives 11.89% 
returns on the dollar she invested in the S & P 500 and the returns on Treasury bills in that year 
is 5.97%, she would be willing to pay $0.15 [(11.89-5.97)*2.58%]-$0.56[(11.89-5.97)*9.49%] to 
have all the fluctuations associated with the returns on the S & P 500 eliminated.  
Column 2 of Table 4 reports the welfare costs of returns calculated from Equation (5). As 
is clear, these estimates are significantly larger than Lucas’s estimates of costs of consumption 
volatility and are driven by higher volatility of asset returns compared to the volatility of 
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consumption4.  The effect of loss aversion on the welfare costs of business cycles are revealed 
when we compare the costs produced by the prospective preference with those reported in 
column 2. The first row reports the costs associated with the linear prospective function. The 
results give two important insights regarding the impact of loss aversion on the welfare costs of 
volatility. First, expect for the case of loss neutrality, costs associated with the prospective utility 
are higher than those with Lucas preference. Second, as the degree of loss aversion grows, the 
welfare costs increases. These results suggest that while higher volatility in asset returns 
generates higher welfare costs, inclusion of loss aversion into the agents’ preferences also 
contributes to the higher welfare costs.  
Rows (2)-(5) reports the costs calculated from Equation (10). As for the linear 
prospective preference, the welfare costs produced by the Kahneman and Tversky utility are 
significantly larger than those produced by Lucas’s preference. By comparing the costs produced 
by Kahneman and Tversky utility for loss neutrality (λ =1) with those reported in Column 2, it is 
confirmed that the specific form of the preference function also generates higher welfare costs. 
Our findings, therefore, suggest that both aspects of the prospect theory: the investors care about 
their asset returns and that they are loss averse generate higher welfare costs. However, it is also 
to be noted that, while inclusion of loss aversion contributes to the higher welfare costs, 
estimates in rows 2, 3 and 5 imply that the costs do not necessarily increase with higher λ. This 
implies that while the investor has loss aversion attitude, the degree of loss aversion is limited.  
 
5. Sensitivity Analysis 
 The welfare costs estimated for different values of risk aversion and loss aversion 
parameters in the previous section are large. In this section, we analyze whether these estimates 
change with alternative specification of prospective preferences and a different data set. 
 We consider an exponential prospective preference function where the utility of the 
investor depends on the degrees of both risk aversion and loss aversion. This is captured in the 
following utility function:  
                                                 
4 The standard deviation of the log of US real quarterly consumption reported in Lucas (1987) is 0.013. We find that 
the standard deviation of annual excess returns is 0.1670. 
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Where 0<α = β<1 represent the degrees of risk aversion.  
The utility function is similar to that portrayed in Figure 13. When the agent realizes a 
gain on her investments, her utility is just like a normal exponential utility function. On the other 
hand, when a loss occurs, the utility of the investor decreases by a magnitude higher than the 
increase in utility caused by a gain, which is reflected by the loss aversion parameter λ.  
Using the method of welfare cost estimation, explained in section 3, we derive that the 
cost of fluctuating returns to the investor with linear prospective preferences is as follows: 
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     Figure 13: Utility of Gains and Losses 
 
Note: The kink at the origin represents the degree of loss aversion. The curvature to the right of the 
kink represents the degree of risk aversion when a gain occurs and the left represents the degree of risk 
aversion when a loss is occurred. 
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 The cost estimates are presented in Table 5. The entries in the table represent the 
percentage of excess returns the agent is willing to give up to switch to a world of smooth returns 
from a world of volatile returns. 
 
Table 5: Welfare Costs with CRRA Prospective Utility 
Risk 
aversion 
Lucas 
(returns) 
λ =1 λ =1.2 λ =1.5 λ =1.8 λ =2
α=. 05 0.069 0.59 1.50 2.84 4.16 5.01 
α=. 1 0.14 0.91 1.80 3.11 4.35 5.13 
α=. 5 0.70 3.98 4.56 5.25 5.69 5.86 
α=. 8 1.12 5.85 5.89 5.91 5.92 5.92 
     Note: We assume that α=β. 
 
It appears that the investor with a CRRA prospective preference is willing to pay 1.50-
5.92% of the average excess returns she receives, to have all the fluctuations eliminated. From 
these results we find it difficult to separate the contribution of the agent’s degrees of risk 
aversion and loss aversion to the welfare cost estimates. However, it appears that for a given 
degree of loss aversion, as the degree of risk aversion grows, the welfare costs of volatile returns 
increases.  Similarly, for a given value of risk aversion parameter, the costs of volatility increases 
as the degree of risk aversion increases. Although risk aversion and loss aversion refer to 
different aspects, both of them come together to represent the conservative nature of the agent. 
Thus our results suggest that when the agents hold conservative attitude towards their 
investments they are intensively hurt by the fluctuations in their asset returns which is consistent 
with our previous findings. 
To check the robustness of our estimate we re-estimate the cost by using the CRSP 
NYSE annual index returns and the returns on 5-year bonds respectively to represent the returns 
on risky and risk-free asset. The results of this experiment are reported in Table 6. 
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     Table 6: Sensitivity Test 
 λ =1.5 λ =1.8 λ =2 λ =2.25 λ =2.5 λ =3 
α= 1 1.70 3.18 4.16 5.39 6.62 9.07 
α=. 05 9.41 9.41 9.41 9.41 9.41 9.41 
α=. 1 9.41 9.41 9.41 9.41 9.41 9.41 
α=. 2 9.36 9.40 9.41 9.41 9.41 9.41 
α=. 5 7.41 8.25 8.69 9.09 9.33 9.33 
       Note: α=1 reduces the Kahneman and Tversky utility function to a linear prospective utility function. 
 
 Following the same method of cost estimation discussed in section 4, we find that, for 
different values of loss aversion parameters, the cost of fluctuating returns ranges from 1.70-
9.41%. The first row suggests that the costs increases as the degree of loss aversion grows, which 
proves the robustness of our original results. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 In this paper we estimate the welfare cost of business cycles that occurs due not to the 
consumption volatility but due to the fluctuations in the asset returns of the investor. The investor 
derives utility from the returns on her investments and is more sensitive to losses than gains in 
her investments. The welfare cost of business cycles is estimated as the percentage of the average 
returns the agent would give up to switch from a world of volatile returns to a world of smooth 
returns. Following Lucas’s approach of cost estimation, we find that the investor is willing to 
give up 2.58-9.49% of the average returns to live in the world of zero fluctuation. We find that 
both aspects of the prospect theory: the investors care about their asset returns and that they are 
loss averse, contributes to the higher welfare costs of fluctuations. The sensitivity analysis in 
section 5 confirms the robustness of our welfare cost estimates. We believe that this indicates a 
welfare cost that is much larger than Lucas’s estimates. 
 The exercise in this paper raises a number of questions for future exploration. For the 
sake of simplicity, we calculated the cost of volatile returns to the agent whose utility from the 
returns in a specific year depends only on the outcome of investment in that year. We ignore the 
prior outcomes of her investments and calculate the utility she derives each year assuming that 
her degree of risk aversion remains constant overtime. A strand of psychology literature suggests 
that the prior outcomes of an agent’s investment may affect her subsequent risk-taking behavior. 
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Current losses are less painful to the agent if they occur after prior gains, and more painful if 
they follow prior losses. Thus an investor becomes less risk averse after she realizes gains and 
more risk averse if losses occur in the past. An interesting exercise would be to include the prior 
outcomes of investments into the agent’s preferences and test how it affects the welfare cost of 
fluctuating asset returns. 
 In this study we separate the utility function of the agent into two parts. The first part 
concerns the utility from consumption and the second part is the utility function of a financial 
investment. We estimate the welfare cost by applying prospect theory preferences only to the 
second part of the utility function. It is often believed that people care about the changes in their 
consumption level and that there is a consumption benchmark to which they compare their 
current consumption level. During the recession of the economy an agent’s consumption level 
may fall below the benchmark and during the economy’s upsurge it may rise above the 
benchmark. If the agent holds a loss aversion attitude towards her consumption, the magnitude of 
decrease in utility from a fall in the consumption level below the benchmark will be greater than 
the increase in utility resulting from the same consumption level higher than the benchmark. An 
important exercise would be to incorporate prospect theory preferences to the entire utility 
function of the agent and estimate the welfare cost of business cycles to an agent who 
experiences fluctuations in her consumption level as well as in the returns on her investments. 
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